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Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of institutional quality on financing choice of individual using 
a large dataset of 137,160 people from 131 countries. We classify borrowing activities into 
three categories, including formal, constructive informal, and underground borrowing. 
Although the result shows that better institutions aids the uses of formal borrowing, the 
impact of institutions on constructive informal and underground borrowing among three 
country sub-groups differs. Higher institutional quality improves constructive informal 
borrowing in middle-income countries but reduces the use of underground borrowing in high- 
and low-income countries.      
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1. Introduction 
According to World Bank’s Global Findex Database Report, globally, around 1.7 billion 
adults remain unbanked. Moreover, while nearly 60% of borrowers in high-income countries 
reported borrowing from a financial institution or using a credit card, the ratio in developing 
countries is about one third of such number. This urges for the research on which and how 
individual and country factors determine inclusive finance in general, and borrowing practices 
in particular. The objective of this paper is to identify how institutional quality affects the 
practice of household’s formal and informal borrowing across high-, middle-, and low-income 
countries. We refer a loan as a formal borrowing if the lender is a bank or another type of 
financial institution and as an informal borrowing otherwise. We follow Allen et al. (2018) to 
classify informal borrowing into two categories, namely constructive informal borrowing and 
underground borrowing. The former includes trade credit from a store, lending from relatives 
or friends; thus, to some extent, it is deemed to benefit the borrower, as there exists the 
exchange of information between two parties. In contrast, underground financing, i.e. credit 
from loan sharks, unregistered pawnshop and so on, has characteristics of little information 
exchange, high interest rate, the high probability of violence in case of delinquency. We apply 
these definitions to classify respondents in the World Bank’s 2017 Global Financial Inclusion 
database into three types of who borrows from formal, constructive informal, and 
underground borrowing sources. Next, to investigate the impact of institutional quality on 
financial inclusion, we collect the institutional quality indicators from World Governance 
Indicator database.   
This paper fills the literature gap of determinants, especially institutional quality, of financial 
inclusion. Overall, we find that being a male, more educated, richer, and older to a certain age 
has a higher probability of borrowing formally. However, constructive informal financing, 
like borrowing from family, friends, or a store, is not significantly affected by education level 
in all three country sub-groups while underground financing activities is better controlled 
when people are more educated in high- and middle-income countries only. The positive role 
of higher income level in reducing the likelihood of borrowing informally occurs mostly in 
high-income countries. Our first key finding on the effect of institutional quality is that better 
institutional quality favors the prevalence of formal borrowing in all three country sub-groups. 
Second, higher institutional quality supports the use of constructive informal borrowing in 
middle-income countries. For underground financing, better institutional quality significantly 
decreases the likelihood that a person in high- and low-income countries takes out an 
underground loan. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 
details the data and empirical approach used. Section 4 presents results. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature review 
There are two popular strands of literature on the relationship between institutional quality 
and financial development as well as the determinants of financial inclusion. In this section, 
we briefly review the development of these two groups. 
In recent years, institutional quality has gained popularity in explaining the finance 
development and economic growth relationship. Using panel data of 72 countries from 1978 
to 2000, Demetriades and Law (2006) conclude that financial development has larger effect 
on long-run economic development when the financial system is embedded within a sound 
institutional framework. They use the institutions dataset from Internal Country Risk Guide, 
published by Political Risk Services, which cover five indicators, namely, corruption, law and 
order, bureaucratic quality, government stability, and democracy and accountability. Law et 
al. (2013) find that the marginal effect of financial development on growth depends on 
institutional quality. The institutional quality is measured using two datasets, the Internal 
Country Risk Guide and World Governance Indicators. The estimation result for 87 countries 
shows that the finance curse occurs under weak institution quality conditions. Countries with 
better institutions receive more benefits from financial development than low-institutional 
quality countries do. Slesman et al. (2019) argue that there exists a critical threshold of 
political institution, over which financial development has a positive effect on economic 
growth. Based on a dataset of 77 developing and emerging countries, they find robust 
evidences that good-quality political institution is an important conductor for financial 
development to foster economic growth. Institutions also influence poverty and inequality. 
Chong and Calderon (2000) concluded that high institutional quality reduces inequality in rich 
countries but increases inequality in poor countries. Chong and Gradstein (2007) use Internal 
Country Risk Guide dataset to measure the impact of institutions on inequality in more than 
100 countries. They find that institution quality is an important tool for reducing inequality. 
Majeed (2017) concludes that both inclusive financial development and institutions are 
essential for eradicating poverty for Islamic countries. 
The second line of literature studies the determinants of financial inclusion as well as its 
impacts on household living and firm’s operation. Allen et al. (2016) study the factors 
underpinning the account ownership and usage. They take advantage of 2014 Global 
Financial Inclusion database and a variety of country level characteristics to find how 
different individual and country characteristics affect the the probability of owing an account, 
using it to save, and using it frequently. The results show that greater inclusive finance 
associates with better environment to access financial services. Zins and Weill (2016) find 
that being a man, richer, more educated, and older to a certain age increases the likelihood of 
using formal financial services in African countries. Fungáčová and Weill (2015) find the 
similar results for Chinese people. Recent research also investigate the factors determining 
informal financing, the relationship between formal financing and informal financing, as well 
as the impacts of informal financing on both individuals and firms. Khoi et al. (2013) examine 
the factors influencing household’s access to formal and informal credit in the Vietnamese 
rural market. Using data surveyed from nearly 1,000 households from 15 villages of 13 
communes in the Mekong River Delta, they find the interaction between the two credit sectors 
in which informal credit can alter the likelihood of the households’ access to formal 
microcredit program. They also indicate several determinants of informal borrowing, such as 
land holding, loan purpose, interest rate, loan duration, and road access. Using household 
panel dataset in rural Bangladesh, Islam et al. (2014) indicate that access to microfinance 
reduces the probability of taking out an informal loan but not the loan amount. For firms, 
Dygryse et al. (2016) conclude that different types of external finance have different 
beneficial impacts on the borrowing firms. They identify a complementary effect between 
formal and informal finance for the sales growth of small firms but not for large firms. Allen 
et al. (2108) divide informal financing into two categories with distinct characteristics based 
on two criteria, information technology for monitoring, risk control, pricing and the violence 
mechanism in case of delinquency. Using data from China’s small and medium enterprises, 
they find that constructive informal financing supports firm growth while underground 
financing do not.  
Recently, several researchers connect two above-mentioned literature lines to examine the 
effect of institutional quality on financial inclusion. Madestam (2014) develops a model to 
investigate whether and how legal institutions affect the prevalence of informal finance. It is 
confirmed that weaker legal institutions increase the popularity of informal credit if borrowers 
obtain money from both financial sectors while the opposite is true if informal lenders supply 
all funds.  Allen et al. (2016) investigate the impacts of legal rights index and political risk 
rating on the ownership and usage of account. They find that both indicators positively affect 
the financial inclusion indicator after controlling for level of economic development. 
However, the literature is still lack of research examining the effect of institutional quality on 
informal and formal borrowing. Our paper deals with this gap by investigating impact of 
institutional quality, proxied by government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law, 
on how individual borrows.  
3. Data and model specification 
3.1. Data 
We utilize the World Bank’s Governance Indicators Database and 2014 Global Financial 
Inclusion Database to measure the effects of institutional quality on individual borrowing 
activities. The Global Financial Inclusion Database is the most comprehensive database that 
reflects how adults around the world save, borrow, make payments, and manage risks. The 
database is collected through the 2014 calendar year, covering about 150,000 adults in more 
than 140 economies. In this paper, we focus only on the financing side of financial inclusion, 
which includes both formal and informal borrowing activities. Formal borrowing is defined as 
an individual borrows any money from a bank, or another type of formal financial institution. 
We follow Allen et al. (2018) to classify informal borrowing into two categories, namely 
constructive informal borrowing and underground borrowing. The formal includes activities 
of borrowing from a store using installment credit, buying on credit, and borrowing from 
family, relatives, or friends. This informal sources use personal, community, or business 
relationships to reduce asymmetric information and risk through economic collateral. The 
price of credit reflects both the risk and the closeness of the relationship between borrowers 
and lenders (Allen et al. 2018). In contrast, the latter category refers to respondents who 
borrow from another private lender, i.e., loan shark, payday lender, or pawnshop. This lending 
practice associates with low information level exchange, high lending rate and fee, and 
sometimes, violence in the case of delinquency. Thus, we have four variables, including 
formal borrowing, informal borrowing, informal constructive borrowing, and underground 
borrowing. The four indicators are converted to dummy variables which equal to one if the 
respondent responded yes to the surveyed question and zero otherwise.  
Individual characteristics that affect borrowing activities are gender, age, education, and 
income. Gender is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual is a man and zero 
otherwise. To consider the possible non-linear relationship between age and financial 
inclusion mentioned in previous research, we use both individual’s age and its squared. 
Education level is measured by two dummy variables, which equal to one if the individual has 
secondary education and completed tertiary education or more. We use four dummy variables 
to measure income (second 20%, third 20%, fourth 20%, and richest 20%) which equal to one 
if the individual’s income belongs to the corresponding quintile. The omitted dummy variable 
is for the poorest 20%. All these explanatory variables are provided in the survey dataset 
published by the World Bank.  
We follow the World Bank (2002) to define institutional, or governance quality, as “the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised”. The six dimensions of 
institutional quality belongs to three areas, includes “the process by which governments are 
selected, monitored, and replaced”, “the capacity of the government to effectively formulate 
and implement sound policies”, and “the respect of citizens and the stage for the institutions 
that govern economic and social interactions among them”. However, in this paper, we 
employ only three out of six indicators, namely, government effectiveness and regulatory 
quality of the second area as well as rule of law of the third area to represent the institutional 
quality
1
. We select these indicators because they are more relevant in determining financial 
inclusion than other remaining indicators. The first indicator, government effectiveness, 
measures the quality of public service, civil service, as well as policy formulation and 
implementation. These factors are very important in ensuring that all citizens are able to 
receive the benefit of public services, which is a pre-determinant for accessing and using 
financial services. The second indicator, regulatory quality, captures the ability of government 
to conduct policies and regulations that promotes private sector development. The 
development of private sector is one of determining factors that push the inclusive finance in 
both supply and demand sides. The third indicator, rule of law, quantifies the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. This indicator is deemed to 
strongly affect financial inclusion as it reflects the quality of contract enforcement, property 
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 For a detailed discussion of institutional quality, see Kaufmann et al. (2010). 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Although we 
average the three indicators to obtain one institutional quality indicator, we conduct 
regressions for all three indicators to see the individual effect of each indicator on financing 
choices. We take institutional quality data in the year 2013, back to 1 year in compared to the 
year of financial inclusion data.   
Beside the individual and country characteristics mentioned above, we also include four 
variables that reflect the socio-economic condition of an economy. First, the variable GDP per 
capita is used to capture the effect of different level of economic development. Second, we 
use the access to electricity in rural area to measure the infrastructure level. Third, we use 
population density to measure the geographic potential of the country and the size of the 
economy. Fourth, the availability of banking services in a country, measured by the number of 
commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults, is employed.  
3.2. Model specification   
We perform probit estimations to explain the determinants of borrowing practice using the 
following equation: 
 
          
 
       
 
         (1) 
 
where, countries and individuals are indexed by i and j; the dependent variable      represents 
four measures of borrowing practices, including formal borrowing, informal borrowing, 
informal constructive borrowing, and underground borrowing;       is a vector of individual 
characteristics,       is a vector of country characteristics, including institutional quality;      is 
a normally distributed error term with zero mean and variance equals to 1. As the primary 
goal of this paper is to compare the determinants of formal and informal financing for 
different groups of countries, we run model (1) with full sample and three country sub-groups 
according to World Bank’s classification. The standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
country level.  
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive results 
Table 1 presents the main descriptive statistics for four borrowing variables for the global 
level and three groups of countries. We find that the practice of formal borrowing increases 
with the economic development level. Nearly one of five surveyed respondents answer that 
they borrow money from a bank or another financial institution while the ratio in middle-
income and low-income countries is one-eight and one-seventeen respectively. In contrast, the 
practice of informal borrowing is more popular in lower income countries. One of four 
surveyed respondents report that they borrowing informally in high-income countries. 
Moreover, only 2% of respondents in this country group answer that they do take out an 
underground borrowing in the past year. This ratio increases 2.5 times to 5% in middle- and 
low-income countries.  
 Table 1: Indicators for formal and informal borrowing: full and split samples 
 
Full sample High-income Middle-income Low-income 
 
Obs. Mean Std. dev Obs. Mean Std. dev Obs. Mean Std. dev Obs. Mean Std. dev 
Formal borrowing 137,160 0.130 0.336 45,170 0.174 0.379 71,400 0.123 0.328 20,590 0.059 0.236 
Informal borrowing 137,160 0.306 0.461 45,170 0.240 0.427 71,400 0.318 0.466 20,590 0.412 0.492 
Constructive borrowing 137,160 0.294 0.456 45,170 0.235 0.424 71,400 0.303 0.459 20,590 0.398 0.489 
Underground borrowing 137,160 0.040 0.197 45,170 0.020 0.141 71,400 0.050 0.218 20,590 0.052 0.221 
 
Table 2 presents the main descriptive statistics for four measures of institutional quality for 
the global level and three groups of countries. The estimate of institutional quality is a 
standard normal random variable, with zero mean, unit standard deviation, and ranging 
approximately from -2.5 to 2.5. We find that there are large differences in institutional quality 
for three country sub-groups. As expected, countries in high-income have highest scores of 
overall institutional quality, and all three components, followed by middle-income and low-
income countries.  
 Table 2: Indicators for institutional quality: full and split samples 
 
Full sample High-income Middle-income Low-income 
 
Obs. Mean Std. dev Obs. Mean Std. dev Obs. Mean Std. dev Obs. Mean Std. dev 
Overall institutional quality 131 0.144 0.915 45 1.032 0.594 65 -0.419 0.501 21 -0.825 0.425 
Government effectiveness 131 0.090 0.876 45 1.184 0.581 65 -0.340 0.527 21 -0.927 0.421 
Regulatory quality 131 0.152 0.953 45 1.150 0.604 65 -0.253 0.637 21 -0.735 0.453 
Rule of law 131 0.006 1.005 45 1.140 0.648 65 -0.499 0.532 21 -0.859 0.478 
 
4.2. Main results 
Table 3 presents estimation result of determinants of formal and informal borrowing. In the 
left panel of Table 3, we find that a male, more educated, richer, and older to a certain age has 
a higher probability of taking out a loan from financial institution. The marginal probability 
increases with education and income level in full sample and all three country sub-groups. 
Better infrastructure development, lower population density, and higher institutional quality 
associate with higher level of financial inclusion in full sample. Population density has 
different impact on formal borrowing in high-income and low-income countries. In the 
former, lower population densitiy significantly increases the practice of formal borrowing. In 
contrast, increasing population density encourages formal borrowing activities in low-income 
countries. Improving infrastructure is a key to develop inclusive finance in middle-income 
countries.  
For informal borrowing, we find that gender and age, but not education, are important factors 
in determining the likelihood that an individual can obtain an informal loan. While in high-
income countries, an individual belongs to all four income-quintiles has the lower likelihood 
of taking out an informal loan, it is only the case of individual who belongs to the the highest 
income-quintile in middle-income countries. We find that better access to electricity, 
prevalent commercial branches, and high level of institutions significantly reduce the 
probability that an individual takes out an informal loan in middle-income countries.   
Table 3: Effects of institutional quality on formal and informal borrowing 
 Formal borrowing Informal borrowing 
 
Full  
sample 
High- 
income 
Middle- 
income 
Low- 
income 
Full  
sample 
High- 
income 
Middle- 
income 
Low- 
income 
Male 0.108*** 0.130*** 0.091*** 0.109* 0.068*** 0.058** 0.068*** 0.064*** 
 
(0.015) (0.022) (0.022) (0.061) (0.012) (0.024) (0.016) (0.021) 
Age 0.082*** 0.078*** 0.087*** 0.066*** 0.038*** 0.014** 0.046*** 0.043*** 
 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Age_squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Secondary education 0.191*** 0.148*** 0.199*** 0.210*** 0.001 0.019 0.018 0.027 
 
(0.036) (0.046) (0.052) (0.074) (0.032) (0.042) (0.043) (0.086) 
Tertiary education 0.342*** 0.261*** 0.407*** 0.380*** -0.033 -0.037 0.056 -0.247 
 
(0.042) (0.059) (0.055) (0.092) (0.040) (0.055) (0.050) (0.190) 
Income-second 20% 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.113*** 0.026 -0.006 -0.079** 0.023 0.080* 
 
(0.022) (0.027) (0.034) (0.093) (0.021) (0.033) (0.030) (0.048) 
Income-third 20% 0.158*** 0.099*** 0.200*** 0.228*** -0.029 -0.123*** 0.007 0.073 
 
(0.022) (0.032) (0.030) (0.066) (0.024) (0.036) (0.034) (0.068) 
Income-fourth 20% 0.180*** 0.163*** 0.211*** 0.132 -0.056** -0.144*** -0.024 0.032 
 
(0.023) (0.034) (0.032) (0.083) (0.025) (0.035) (0.036) (0.070) 
Income-richest 20% 0.213*** 0.118*** 0.258*** 0.365*** -0.126*** -0.225*** -0.104*** -0.008 
 
(0.029) (0.036) (0.044) (0.069) (0.024) (0.037) (0.035) (0.054) 
GDP per capita -0.076* 0.001 -0.085 0.040 -0.082* 0.042 -0.062 -0.345 
 (0.042) (0.074) (0.082) (0.221) (0.050) (0.099) (0.077) (0.231) 
Access to electricity 0.111*** 0.088 0.090* 0.035 -0.049 0.062 -0.131** -0.061 
 (0.033) (0.224) (0.054) (0.040) (0.039) (0.415) (0.056) (0.073) 
Population density -0.044* -0.069** -0.038 0.192*** -0.001 -0.047 0.017 -0.022 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.042) (0.060) (0.025) (0.037) (0.038) (0.097) 
Commercial branches 0.022 -0.033 0.031 -0.014 -0.064 0.012 -0.122** 0.139 
 (0.048) (0.056) (0.060) (0.118) (0.041) (0.080) (0.052) (0.214) 
Institutional quality 0.229*** 0.191*** 0.239*** 0.233* 0.084 -0.159 0.224* 0.190 
 (0.049) (0.060) (0.082) (0.138) (0.065) (0.145) (0.125) (0.225) 
Constant -2.808*** -2.979*** -2.825*** -4.192*** 0.043 -0.885 0.121 1.452 
 (0.368) (0.834) (0.742) (1.402) (0.426) (1.874) (0.701) (1.578) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.075 0.057 0.064 0.076 0.035 0.046 0.032 0.021 
Log likelihood -46,346 -18,126 -24,637 -3,363 -80,633 -22,845 -45,517 -11,628 
Observations 133,836 41,936 74,327 17,573 133,836 41,936 74,327 17,573 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Clustered errors are in parentheses.   
 
Table 4 shows that the effects of three components on each country sub-group are different. In 
high-income and middle-income country sub-groups, government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, and rule of law have statistically significant and positive influence on formal 
borrowing. In low-income country, only rule of law significantly determines formal 
borrowing. While government effectiveness has the highest impact on formal borrowing in 
high-income countries, regulatory quality is the most important factor in middle-income 
countries. The rule of law has the highest impact on formal borrowing in low-income 
countries and among three country sub-groups.  
Table 4: Effects of institutional quality components on  
formal and informal borrowing 
 Formal borrowing Informal borrowing 
 
Full  
sample 
High- 
income 
Middle- 
income 
Low- 
income 
Full  
sample 
High- 
income 
Middle- 
income 
Low- 
income 
Government effectiveness 0.206*** 0.195*** 0.178** 0.194 0.075 -0.146 0.160 0.244 
 (0.054) (0.061) (0.086) (0.140) (0.066) (0.119) (0.117) (0.220) 
Regulatory quality 0.239*** 0.184*** 0.265*** 0.187 0.098 -0.102 0.249** 0.053 
 (0.048) (0.053) (0.079) (0.130) (0.063) (0.139) (0.105) (0.219) 
Rule of law 0.161*** 0.143* 0.133* 0.253* 0.049 -0.201 0.134 0.239 
 (0.047) (0.074) (0.077) (0.131) (0.056) (0.145) (0.112) (0.189) 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Clustered errors are in parentheses.   
 Table 5 examines the determinants of two types of informal borrowing. In the left panel of 
Table 5, we find that the results are quite similar to the results of informal borrowing. The 
right panel of Table 5 shows some notable results. First, higher education level significantly 
reduces the probability that an individual takes out an underground loan in high-income and 
middle-income countries. Greater income negatively associates with higher underground 
borrowing in full sample and high-income countries only. Better infrastructure in high-income 
countries, more commercial bank branches in high- and midlle-income countries, and higher 
population densitity in low-income countries associate with lower practice of underground 
borrowing. It is also noted that the positive effect of institutional quality on informal 
borrowing in middle-income countries found in Table 4 comes from the constructive informal 
borrowing rather than underground borrowing.  
Table 5: Effects of institutional quality on constructive informal 
and underground borrowing 
 Constructive informal borrowing Underground borrowing 
 
Full  
sample 
High- 
income 
Middle-
income 
Low- 
income 
Full  
sample 
High- 
income 
Middle-
income 
Low- 
income 
Male 0.061*** 0.055** 0.063*** 0.047*** 0.105*** 0.067 0.094*** 0.163*** 
 
(0.012) (0.024) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.054) (0.023) (0.034) 
Age 0.037*** 0.014** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.028*** 0.052*** 0.023*** 
 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) 
Age_squared -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Secondary education 0.008 0.024 0.029 0.022 -0.091* -0.111 -0.112* -0.051 
 
(0.031) (0.044) (0.040) (0.084) (0.053) (0.073) (0.064) (0.086) 
Tertiary education -0.025 -0.028 0.069 -0.251 -0.132** -0.169* -0.154* -0.014 
 
(0.039) (0.057) (0.047) (0.181) (0.066) (0.088) (0.081) (0.133) 
Income-second 20% -0.005 -0.074** 0.020 0.089* -0.044 -0.161*** -0.010 -0.022 
 
(0.021) (0.033) (0.029) (0.048) (0.028) (0.059) (0.036) (0.053) 
Income-third 20% -0.032 -0.125*** -0.000 0.083 -0.002 -0.109 0.033 -0.004 
 
(0.024) (0.036) (0.033) (0.068) (0.033) (0.072) (0.044) (0.068) 
Income-fourth 20% -0.053** -0.138*** -0.026 0.049 -0.069* -0.228*** -0.030 -0.023 
 
(0.025) (0.035) (0.036) (0.066) (0.036) (0.057) (0.049) (0.082) 
Income-richest 20% -0.123*** -0.222*** -0.104*** 0.007 -0.108*** -0.285*** -0.052 -0.109 
 
(0.024) (0.037) (0.035) (0.051) (0.037) (0.072) (0.047) (0.067) 
GDP per capita -0.080 0.021 -0.053 -0.351 -0.017 0.509*** -0.070 -0.239 
 (0.049) (0.098) (0.076) (0.231) (0.075) (0.127) (0.113) (0.244) 
Access to electricity -0.056 0.530 -0.137** -0.068 0.057 -3.105*** 0.004 0.020 
 (0.039) (0.407) (0.053) (0.076) (0.044) (0.515) (0.054) (0.052) 
Population density -0.004 -0.046 0.013 -0.038 0.053 -0.033 0.043 0.227*** 
 (0.025) (0.037) (0.037) (0.101) (0.041) (0.054) (0.050) (0.055) 
Commercial branches -0.061 0.017 -0.119** 0.163 -0.087 -0.292** -0.125* 0.025 
 (0.041) (0.080) (0.051) (0.222) (0.059) (0.134) (0.066) (0.110) 
Institutional quality 0.097 -0.130 0.229* 0.229 -0.195** -0.667*** 0.030 -0.317** 
 (0.065) (0.140) (0.125) (0.229) (0.089) (0.148) (0.158) (0.146) 
Constant 0.045 -2.885 0.078 1.527 -2.531*** 8.451*** -1.821* -1.804 
 (0.423) (1.835) (0.692) (1.610) (0.589) (1.788) (0.981) (1.415) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.033 0.044 0.031 0.023 0.049 0.175 0.033 0.037 
Log likelihood -79,560 -22,650 -44,780 -11,508 -21,612 -3,362 -14,237 -3,422 
Observations 133,836 41,936 74,327 17,573 133,836 41,936 74,327 17,573 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Clustered errors are in parentheses.   
 
Higher institutional quality significantly decreases the likelihood that an individual borrows 
from underground sources in high-income and low-income countries. Table 6 presents the 
effect of each component of institutional quality on constructive informal and underground 
borrowing. We find that in high-income countries, all three components prove effective in 
controlling the underground borrowing practice with the highest impact belongs to 
government effectiveness. In low-income countries, government effectiveness and regulator 
quality significantly decreases the prevalent of underground borrowing. In middle-income 
countries, we do not find any component that significantly associates with underground 
borrowing.     
Table 6: Effects of institutional quality components on constructive informal 
and underground borrowing 
 Constructive informal borrowing Underground borrowing 
 
Full  
sample 
High- 
income 
Middle- 
income 
Low- 
income 
Full  
sample 
High- 
income 
Middle- 
income 
Low- 
income 
Government effectiveness 0.092 -0.113 0.172 0.285 -0.235** -0.702*** -0.045 -0.333* 
 (0.066) (0.117) (0.116) (0.218) (0.095) (0.110) (0.154) (0.195) 
Regulatory quality 0.106* -0.080 0.246** 0.085 -0.126 -0.511*** 0.098 -0.377*** 
 (0.063) (0.133) (0.105) (0.227) (0.079) (0.158) (0.130) (0.135) 
Rule of law 0.061 -0.176 0.137 0.274 -0.162* -0.668*** 0.005 -0.169 
 (0.056) (0.141) (0.111) (0.194) (0.086) (0.184) (0.140) (0.119) 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Clustered errors are in parentheses.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the impacts of institutional quality on formal and informal 
borrowing based on sample 137,160 people from 131 countries. We find that high 
institutional quality significantly increases the probability that an individual takes out a formal 
loan. However, impacts of institutions on informal constructive and underground borrowing 
among country sub-groups are different. Higher institutional quality significantly associates 
with the constructive informal borrowing in middle-income countries while it decreases the 
likelihood that an individual borrows from underground sources in high and low-income 
countries.  
For institutions components, we find that for high-income countries, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law have statistically significant and positive 
impact on both formal borrowing and underground borrowing. In middle-income countries, 
all three components encourage formal borrowing practices but none of them proves effective 
in controlling underground borrowing. In low-income countries, government effectiveness 
and regulator quality significantly decreases the prevalent of underground borrowing.  
For individual characteristics, we find that being a male, more educated, richer, and older to a 
certain age has a higher probability of borrowing formally. However, constructive informal 
financing is not significantly affect by education level in all three country sub-groups while 
underground financing activities is better controlled when people are more educated in only 
high- and middle-income countries. The positive role of higher income level in reducing the 
likelihood of borrowing informally occurs mostly in high-income countries. 
The role of institutional quality found in this paper may have implications for policymakers in 
conducting policies for inclusive finance. Encouraging formal and constructive informal 
borrowing through institutional quality in three country sub-groups requires different 
measures. While policymakers in high- and middle-income countries can target policies that 
improve government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law, those in low-income 
countries should focus on the latter. In contrast, to control underground borrowing, those in 
low-income countries should improve government effectiveness and regulatory quality.    
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